Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Ounsworth Request for Comments: 10073 J. Gray Category: Standards Track Entrust ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Pala OpenCA Labs J. Klaußner Bundesdruckerei GmbH S. Fluhrer Cisco Systems November 2026 Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Abstract This document defines a PQ/T hybrid scheme with concrete instantiations that combine the US NIST Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with traditional algorithms RSASSA- PKCS1-v1_5, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448. These combinations are tailored to meet regulatory guidelines in c
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Ounsworth
Request for Comments: 10073 J. Gray
Category: Standards Track Entrust
ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Pala
OpenCA Labs
J. Klaußner
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
S. Fluhrer
Cisco Systems
November 2026
Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for
Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Abstract
This document defines a PQ/T hybrid scheme with concrete
instantiations that combine the US NIST Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with traditional algorithms RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448. These
combinations are tailored to meet regulatory guidelines in certain
regions. Composite ML-DSA is applicable in applications that use
X.509 or PKIX data structures that accept ML-DSA, but where the
operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs
in ML-DSA and where the level of security provided by Existential
Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) is acceptable.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10073.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
1.2. Notations
1.3. Composite Design Philosophy
2. Overview of the Composite ML-DSA Signature Scheme
2.1. Pre-Hashing
2.2. Prefix, Label, and CTX
3. Composite ML-DSA Functions
3.1. Key Generation
3.1.1. Allowed Modifications to the Key Generation Process
3.2. Sign
3.3. Verify
4. Serialization
4.1. SerializePublicKey and DeserializePublicKey
4.2. SerializePrivateKey and DeserializePrivateKey
4.3. SerializeSignatureValue and DeserializeSignatureValue
5. Use Within X.509 and PKIX
5.1. Encoding to DER
5.2. Key Usage Bits
5.3. ASN.1 Definitions
6. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
6.1. RSASSA-PSS Parameters
7. ASN.1 Module
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Module Registration
8.2. Object Identifier Registrations
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Why Hybrids?
9.2. EUF-CMA, SUF-CMA, and Non-Separability
9.2.1. EUF-CMA
9.2.2. SUF-CMA
9.2.3. Non-Separability
9.3. Key Reuse
9.4. Use of Prefix for Attack Mitigation
9.5. Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms
10. Operational Considerations
10.1. Rationale for Choices
10.2. FIPS Certification
10.3. Backwards Compatibility
10.4. Profiling Down the Number of Options
10.5. External Pre-Hashing
10.6. Interoperability of Legacy Algorithms
11. References
11.1. Normative References
11.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Maximum Key and Signature Sizes
Appendix B. Component Algorithm Reference
Appendix C. Component AlgorithmIdentifiers for Public Keys and
Signatures
Appendix D. Message Representative Examples
Appendix E. Test Vectors
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current
cryptographic systems because traditional cryptographic signature
algorithms such as RSA, DSA, and their elliptic curve variants will
become vulnerable to quantum attacks (Section 3 of [RFC9958]).
Unlike previous migrations between cryptographic algorithms, this
migration gives us the foresight that traditional cryptographic
algorithms will be broken in the future but will remain strong in the
interim; the only uncertainty is around the timing. However, there
are also some novel challenges. For instance, the aggressive
migration timelines may require deploying Post-Quantum Cryptography
(PQC) algorithms before their implementations have been fully
hardened or certified, and dual-algorithm data protection may be
desirable over a longer time period to hedge against security
vulnerabilities and other implementation flaws in the new
implementations.
Cautious implementers may opt to combine cryptographic algorithms in
such a way that an adversary would need to break all of them
simultaneously to compromise the protected data. These mechanisms
are referred to as "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrids"
[RFC9794].
This specification defines a specific instantiation of the PQ/T
hybrid paradigm called "composite" where multiple cryptographic
algorithms are combined to form a single signature algorithm. The
composite algorithm presents a single public key and signature value
such that it can be treated as a single atomic algorithm at the
protocol level. This provides a property referred to as "protocol
backwards compatibility" since it can be applied to protocols that
are not explicitly hybrid aware. The idea of a composite was first
presented in [Bindel2017]. Composite algorithms retain some security
even if one of their component algorithms is broken, which is
discussed in detail in Section 9. This specification creates PQ/T
hybrids with the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm
(ML-DSA), defined in [FIPS.204] as the Post-Quantum (PQ) component.
Instantiations of the Composite ML-DSA scheme are provided based on
ML-DSA, RSASSA-PSS, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448.
The full list of algorithms registered by this specification is
provided in Section 6. Backwards compatibility in the sense of
upgraded systems continuing to interoperate with legacy systems is
not directly covered in this specification, but it is the subject of
Section 10.3.
Certain jurisdictions have recommended that ML-DSA be used
exclusively within a PQ/T hybrid framework. The use of a composite
scheme provides a straightforward implementation of hybrid solutions
compatible with (and advocated by) some governments and cybersecurity
agencies [BSI2021] [ANSSI2024].
Some implementers show interest in deploying composites for
regulatory reasons; for example, in some situations, it might be
easier to re-certify an existing product by adding Post-Quantum via a
PQ/T hybrid to an already compliant solution without changing the
traditional component, compared with replacing the traditional
component. Serving this use case, more than any other design
requirement, is what motivates the large number of algorithm
combinations in this specification: The goal is to provide a stepping
stone from which any cryptographic algorithm an organization has
deployed today can evolve or transition.
While this specification registers a large number of composite
algorithms, it is expected that organizations will choose to deploy a
single composite algorithm, or a small number of composite
algorithms, that meet the needs of their environment and operational
constraints, and very few implementers will need to concern
themselves with the entire list. This specification does not specify
any mandatory-to-implement algorithms, but Section 10.4 provides a
short list of recommended composite algorithms for common use cases.
Composite ML-DSA is applicable in PKIX-related applications that
would otherwise use ML-DSA but where it is acceptable to have a
signature primitive with the weaker property of Existential
Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) instead of the
stronger property of Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message
Attack (SUF-CMA), which Composite ML-DSA does not offer.
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification is consistent with the terminology defined in
[RFC9794]. Some relevant definitions from [RFC9794] are copied here
for easier reading. In addition, the following terminology is used
throughout this specification:
*Algorithm*: The usage of the term "algorithm" within this
specification generally refers to any function that has a
registered Object Identifier (OID) for use within an ASN.1
AlgorithmIdentifier.
*Application Backwards Compatibility*: A property indicating whether
an upgraded and non-upgraded application can successfully
establish communication.
*Composite Cryptographic Element*: The definition in [RFC9794] is as
follows:
| A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component
| cryptographic elements of the same type for use in a multi-
| algorithm scheme, such that the resulting composite
| cryptographic element is exposed as a singular interface of the
| same type as the component cryptographic elements.
For example, this could be an asymmetric algorithm such as "ML-
DSA-65" or "RSASSA-PSS".
*DER*: Distinguished Encoding Rules, as defined in [X.690].
*ECDSA*: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm defined in
[FIPS.186-5].
*EdDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448*: The Edwards-curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (EdDSA) defined in [RFC8410], with two parameter sets:
Ed25519 and Ed448.
*ML-DSA*: The Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm
defined in [FIPS.204].
*PKI*: Public Key Infrastructure, as defined in [RFC5280].
*Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Scheme*: [RFC9794] defines a
PQ/T hybrid scheme as follows:
| A multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm
| is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional
| algorithm.
*Protocol Backwards Compatibility*: A property whereby a new feature
can be added to a protocol without requiring any changes to the
protocol's specification and only minimal changes to its
implementations. Typically, this means that the new feature fits
within a defined extension point of the protocol instead of
requiring a structural change to the protocol. This is notable
because many PQ/T hybrids require modification of the protocol to
make it "hybrid aware", whereas this specification presents it as
a standalone algorithm and thus can take advantage of existing
cryptographic agility mechanisms.
*RSA*: The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem, used in this
specification as the Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS)
defined in [RFC8017].
*Signature*: A digital cryptographic signature, making no
assumptions about which algorithm.
1.2. Notations
The algorithm descriptions use Python-like syntax. The following
symbols deserve special mention:
||
represents concatenation of two byte arrays.
[:]
represents byte array slicing.
(a, b)
represents a pair of values a and b. Typically, this indicates
that a function returns multiple values; the exact conveyance
mechanism (tuple, struct, output parameters, etc.) is left to the
implementer.
(a, _)
represents a pair of values where one (the second one in this
case) is ignored.
func(a) -> b
represents a function named func that takes a as input and
produces b.
Func<TYPE>()
represents a function that is parameterized by <TYPE> meaning that
the function's implementation will have minor differences
depending on the underlying TYPE. Typically, this means that a
function will need to look up different constants or use different
underlying cryptographic primitives depending on which composite
algorithm it is implementing.
1.3. Composite Design Philosophy
Composite algorithms, as defined in this specification, follow the
definition in [RFC9794] and should be regarded as a single algorithm
that performs a single cryptographic operation typical of a digital
signature algorithm. This generally means that the complexity of
combining algorithms can and should be handled by the cryptographic
library or cryptographic module. The design intent is that protocols
such as PKCS #10 [RFC2986], the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
[RFC9810], X.509 [RFC5280], the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652], and the Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] can treat composite
algorithms as they would any other algorithm without the protocol
layer to have any "hybrid awareness". This is a property referred to
as "protocol backwards compatibility".
Discussion of the specific choices of algorithm pairings can be found
in Section 10.1.
In terms of security properties, the document considers the following
two security properties: Existential Unforgeability under Chosen
Message Attack (EUF-CMA) and Strong Unforgeability under Chosen
Message Attack (SUF-CMA), which are discussed more rigorously in
Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2. As a simplified summary, Composite ML-DSA
will be EUF-CMA secure if at least one of its component algorithms is
EUF-CMA secure and the pre-hashed message representative PH is
collision resistant. SUF-CMA security of Composite ML-DSA is more
complicated. While some of the algorithm combinations defined in
this specification are likely to be SUF-CMA secure against classical
adversaries, none are SUF-CMA secure against a quantum adversary.
This means that replacing an ML-DSA signature with a Composite ML-DSA
signature is a reduction in security and should not be used in
applications sensitive to the difference between SUF-CMA and EUF-CMA
security. Composite ML-DSA is NOT RECOMMENDED for use in
applications where it has not been shown that EUF-CMA is acceptable.
Further discussion can be found in Section 9.2.
2. Overview of the Composite ML-DSA Signature Scheme
Composite ML-DSA is a PQ/T hybrid signature scheme that combines ML-
DSA as specified in [FIPS.204] and [RFC9881] with one of the RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS algorithms defined in [RFC8017], the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) scheme defined in
Section 6 of [FIPS.186-5], or Ed25519/Ed448 defined in [RFC8410].
The two component signatures are combined into a composite algorithm
via a "signature combiner" function, which performs pre-hashing and
prepends several signature label values to the message prior to
passing it to the component algorithms. Composite ML-DSA achieves
weak non-separability as well as several other security properties,
which are described in the Security Considerations in Section 9.
Composite signature schemes are defined as cryptographic primitives
that match the API of a generic signature scheme, which consists of
three algorithms:
KeyGen() -> (pk, sk):
A probabilistic key generation algorithm that generates a public
key pk and a secret key sk. Some cryptographic modules may also
expose a KeyGen(seed) -> (pk, sk), which generates pk and sk
deterministically from a seed. This specification assumes a seed-
based key generation for ML-DSA.
Sign(sk, M) -> s:
A signing algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk and a
message M, and outputs a signature s. Signing routines may take
additional parameters such as a context string or a hash function
to use for pre-hashing the message.
Verify(pk, M, s) -> true or false:
A verification algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a
message M, and a signature s, and outputs true if the signature
verifies correctly and outputs false or an error otherwise.
Verification routines may take additional parameters such as a
context string or a hash function to use for pre-hashing the
message.
The following algorithms are defined for serializing and
deserializing component values and are provided as internal functions
for use by the public functions KeyGen(), Sign(), and Verify().
These algorithms are inspired by similar algorithms in [RFC9180].
SerializePublicKey(mldsaPK, tradPK) -> bytes:
Produce a byte string encoding of the component public keys.
DeserializePublicKey(bytes) -> (mldsaPK, tradPK):
Parse a byte string to recover the component public keys.
SerializePrivateKey(mldsaSeed, tradSK) -> bytes:
Produce a byte string encoding of the component private keys.
Note that the seed for key generation is used as the interoperable
private key format for ML-DSA.
DeserializePrivateKey(bytes) -> (mldsaSeed, tradSK):
Parse a byte string to recover the component private keys.
SerializeSignatureValue(mldsaSig, tradSig) -> bytes:
Produce a byte string encoding of the component signature values.
DeserializeSignatureValue(bytes) -> (mldsaSig, tradSig):
Parse a byte string to recover the component signature values.
Full definitions of serialization and deserialization algorithms can
be found in Section 4.
2.1. Pre-Hashing
The ML-DSA algorithm as specified in [FIPS.204] is not pre-hashed,
meaning that the entire to-be-signed message is passed into ML-
DSA.Sign(sk, M, ctx) (see Algorithm 2 in [FIPS.204]). While there
are some cryptographic advantages to designing a signature algorithm
this way, it also has some operational drawbacks, namely the
performance and privacy implications of needing to stream the entire
to-be-signed message to the signing module or service, which is
doubled in the context of a composite since the to-be-signed message
needs to be streamed to both underlying component algorithms. Also,
"pure" (i.e., not pre-hashed) modes lack support for digesting the
message once and then signing the digest with multiple different keys
or multiple different context ctx values.
Composite ML-DSA takes a design approach that mirrors that of
Algorithm 2 in [FIPS.204] in that the to-be-signed message
representative M' contains a hash of the message PH( M ) instead of
the full message M:
M' := Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )
This closely mirrors the construction of M' in Algorithm 4 of
[FIPS.204].
Given this design of Composite ML-DSA, it is possible to split the
pre-hashing step out from the signature generation process; see
Section 10.5 for further discussion and sample algorithms.
Note that while the overall construction of Composite ML-DSA is
similar to that of HashML-DSA, the ML-DSA component inside the
composite is "pure" ML-DSA; implementing this specification does not
require an implementation of HashML-DSA.
2.2. Prefix, Label, and CTX
The to-be-signed message representative M', defined in Section 3.2,
is created by concatenating several values, including the pre-hashed
message.
M' := Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )
Prefix: A fixed octet string that is the byte encoding of the ASCII
string "CompositeAlgorithmSignatures2025", which in hex is:
436F6D706F73697465416C676F726974686D5369676E61747572657332303235
See Section 9.4 for more information on the prefix.
Label: A signature label that is specific to each composite
algorithm. The signature label binds the signature to the
specific composite algorithm. Signature label values for each
algorithm are listed in Section 6.
len(ctx): A single unsigned byte encoding the length of the context.
ctx: The context bytes, which allow for applications to bind the
signature to an application context.
PH( M ): The hash of the message to be signed.
Each Composite ML-DSA algorithm has a unique signature label value
that is used in constructing the message representative M' in the
Composite-ML-DSA.Sign() (Section 3.2) and Composite-ML-DSA.Verify()
(Section 3.3). This helps protect against component signature values
being removed from the composite and used out of context of X.509; it
also helps protect if the prohibition on reusing key material between
a composite and a non-composite or between two composites is not
adhered to.
Within Composite ML-DSA, values of Label are fully specified, and
runtime-variable Label values are not allowed. For authors of
follow-on specifications that allow Label to be runtime-variable, it
should be pre-fixed with the length, len(Label) || Label, to prevent
using this as an injection site that could enable various
cryptographic attacks.
The length of the to-be-signed message M' depends on the application
context ctx provided at runtime, but since ctx has a maximum length
of 255 bytes, M' has a fixed maximum length that depends on the
output size of the hash function chosen as PH but can be computed per
composite algorithm.
3. Composite ML-DSA Functions
This section describes the Composite ML-DSA functions needed to
instantiate the public API of a digital signature scheme as defined
in Section 2.
3.1. Key Generation
In order to maintain security properties of the composite, this
specification strictly forbids reusing component key material between
composite and non-composite keys or between multiple composite keys.
This means that an invocation of Composite-ML-DSA.KeyGen() MUST
perform, or otherwise guarantee, fresh generation of the key material
for both underlying algorithms and MUST NOT reuse existing key
material. See Section 9.3 for further discussion of the security
implications.
To generate a new key pair for composite schemes, the KeyGen() ->
(pk, sk) function is used. The KeyGen() function calls the two key
generation functions of the component algorithms independently.
Multi-threaded, multi-process, or multi-module applications might
choose to execute the key generation functions in parallel for better
key generation performance or architectural modularity.
The following describes how to instantiate a KeyGen() function for a
given composite algorithm represented by <OID>.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.KeyGen() -> (pk, sk)
Explicit inputs:
None
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
ML-DSA The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and
parameter set, for example, "ML-DSA-65".
Trad The underlying traditional algorithm and
parameter set, for example, "RSASSA-PSS"
or "Ed25519".
Output:
(pk, sk) The composite key pair.
Key generation process:
1. Generate component keys.
mldsaSeed = Random(32)
(mldsaPK, mldsaSK) = ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(mldsaSeed)
(tradPK, tradSK) = Trad.KeyGen()
2. Check for component key generation failure.
if NOT (mldsaPK, mldsaSK) or NOT (tradPK, tradSK):
output "Key generation error"
3. Output the composite public and private keys.
pk = SerializePublicKey(mldsaPK, tradPK)
sk = SerializePrivateKey(mldsaSeed, tradSK)
return (pk, sk)
This key generation process makes use of the seed-based ML-
DSA.KeyGen_internal(ξ), which is defined in Algorithm 6 of
[FIPS.204]. For FIPS-certification implications, see Section 10.2.
In order to ensure fresh keys, the key generation functions MUST be
executed for both component algorithms. Compliant parties MUST NOT
use, import, or export component keys that are used in other contexts
and combinations or by themselves as keys for standalone algorithm
use. For more details on the security considerations around key
reuse, see Section 9.3.
If one of the component KeyGen() routines returns an error, then the
Composite-ML-DSA.KeyGen() routine MUST also return an error.
3.1.1. Allowed Modifications to the Key Generation Process
Key generation is a process that is entirely internal to a
cryptographic module, and as such, it is often customized to fit the
performance or operational requirements of the module. In cases
where the private keys never leave the module or are otherwise not
required to interoperate with other cryptographic modules, it is not
required for interoperability for the private keys to match the
format described in this specification. Therefore, in general,
implementations of Composite ML-DSA MAY use an alternate key
generation process so long as it generates compatible public keys and
so long as both component keys are freshly generated and not reused
in a standalone key or within another composite key. Below are some
examples of modifications that an implementer MAY make to the key
generation process.
The following are some examples of modifications that an
implementation could make to the key generation process without
affecting interoperability:
* Modifying the process to additionally output the expanded mldsaSK
or to make use of ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(mldsaSeed) as needed to
expand the ML-DSA seed into an expanded key prior to performing a
signing operation.
* Modifying the process to have a deterministic key generation of
one or both component keys from a seed; for example, exposing an
interface of Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.KeyGen(seed) such that one
component algorithm is generated from the seed and the other from
random, or the input seed is cryptographically expanded to produce
seeds for both components. Implementation details and security
analysis of such a modified key generation process are outside the
scope of this document.
* Where interoperable private keys are not required, using a
different private key representation than the one given in
Section 4.2. For example, storing the component keys in separate
cryptographic modules, in separate PKCS #8 objects, or in a format
that preserves the ML-DSA expanded key instead of the ML-DSA seed.
The required modifications to the key generation process, as well
as the signature generation process below, to support these
private key representations are considered compliant with this
specification so long as they generate compatible public keys and
so long as both component keys are freshly generated. Note that
when implementing Composite ML-DSA with a private key format that
does not preserve the ML-DSA seed, especially when implementing on
top of a cryptographic module that does not support seeds, it will
be impossible to reconstruct a compliant seed-based private key as
described in Section 4.2.
3.2. Sign
The Sign() algorithm of Composite ML-DSA mirrors the construction of
ML-DSA.Sign(sk, M, ctx) defined in Algorithm 2 of Section 5.2 of
[FIPS.204]. Composite ML-DSA exposes an API similar to that of ML-
DSA, despite the fact that it includes pre-hashing in a similar way
to HashML-DSA. Internally, it uses pure ML-DSA as the component
algorithm since there is no advantage to pre-hashing twice.
The following describes how to instantiate a Sign() function for a
given Composite ML-DSA algorithm represented by <OID>. See
Section 2.1 for a discussion of the pre-hash function PH. See
Section 2.2 for a discussion on the signature label Label and
application context ctx. See Section 10.5 for a discussion of
externalizing the pre-hashing step.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign(sk, M, ctx) -> s
Explicit inputs:
sk Composite private key consisting of signing private keys
for each component.
M The message to be signed, an octet string.
ctx The application context string used in the composite
signature combiner, which defaults to the empty string.
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
ML-DSA The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set, for
example, "ML-DSA-65".
Trad The underlying traditional algorithm and
parameter set, for example, "sha256WithRSAEncryption"
or "Ed25519".
Prefix The prefix octet string.
Label A signature label that is specific to each composite
algorithm. Additionally, the composite label is passed
into the underlying ML-DSA primitive as the ctx.
Signature Label values are defined in the
"Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters" section.
PH The function used to pre-hash M.
Output:
s The composite signature value.
Signature generation process:
1. If len(ctx) > 255:
return error
2. Compute the message representative M'.
As in FIPS 204, len(ctx) is encoded as a single unsigned byte.
M' := Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )
3. Separate the private key into component keys
and regenerate the ML-DSA key from the seed.
(mldsaSeed, tradSK) = DeserializePrivateKey(sk)
(_, mldsaSK) = ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(mldsaSeed)
4. Generate the two component signatures independently by
calculating the signature over M' according to their algorithm
specifications.
mldsaSig = ML-DSA.Sign( mldsaSK, M', mldsa_ctx=Label )
tradSig = Trad.Sign( tradSK, M' )
5. If either ML-DSA.Sign() or Trad.Sign() returns an error, then
this process MUST return an error.
if NOT mldsaSig or NOT tradSig:
output "Signature generation error"
6. Output the encoded composite signature value.
s = SerializeSignatureValue(mldsaSig, tradSig)
return s
Note that in Step 4 above, a timing side channel could be introduced
depending on how errors generated by the component primitives are
handled at the composite layer. In particular, it could leak which
component signature algorithm failed. In general, it will be
extremely difficult for a composite implementation to mask timing
side channels of this nature if the component primitives themselves
are not constant time, including error cases; thus, in general, there
is not much to do here, but it is mentioned anyway in case this
observation is useful for a high-security implementation.
Note that there are two different context strings ctx at play. The
first is the application context ctx that is passed into Composite-
ML-DSA.Sign and bound to the to-be-signed message M' in Step 2. The
second is the mldsa_ctx in Step 4 that is passed down into the
underlying ML-DSA.Sign(sk, M, ctx) as defined in Algorithm 2 of
[FIPS.204]. Here, Composite ML-DSA itself is the application that
needs to be bound, and so the per-algorithm Label is used as the ctx
for the underlying ML-DSA primitive. Some implementations of the
EdDSA component primitive can also expose a ctx parameter, but even
if present, this is not used by Composite ML-DSA.
It is possible to use component private keys stored in separate
software or hardware keystores. Variations in the process to
accommodate particular private key storage mechanisms are considered
to be conformant to this specification so long as they produce the
same output and error handling as the process sketched above.
3.3. Verify
The Verify() algorithm of Composite ML-DSA mirrors the construction
of ML-DSA.Verify(pk, M, s, ctx) defined in Algorithm 3 of Section 5.3
of [FIPS.204]. Composite ML-DSA exposes an API similar to that of
ML-DSA, despite the fact that it includes pre-hashing in a similar
way to HashML-DSA. Internally, it uses pure ML-DSA as the component
algorithm since there is no advantage to pre-hashing twice.
Compliant applications MUST output "Valid signature" (true) if and
only if all component signatures were successfully validated and
"Invalid signature" (false) otherwise.
The following describes how to instantiate a Verify() function for a
given composite algorithm represented by <OID>. See Section 2.1 for
a discussion of the pre-hash function PH. See Section 2.2 for a
discussion on the signature label Label and application context ctx.
See Section 10.5 for a discussion of externalizing the pre-hashing
step.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Verify(pk, M, s, ctx) -> true or false
Explicit inputs:
pk Composite public key consisting of verification public
keys for each component.
M Message whose signature is to be verified, an octet
string.
s A composite signature value to be verified.
ctx The application context string used in the composite
signature combiner, which defaults to the empty string.
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
ML-DSA The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set, for
example, "ML-DSA-65".
Trad The underlying traditional algorithm and
parameter set, for example, "sha256WithRSAEncryption"
or "Ed25519".
Prefix The prefix octet string.
Label A signature label that is specific to each composite
algorithm. Additionally, the composite label is passed
into the underlying ML-DSA primitive as the ctx.
Signature Label values are defined in the
"Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters" section.
PH The function used to pre-hash M.
Output:
Validity (bool) "Valid signature" (true) if the composite
signature is valid; "Invalid signature"
(false) otherwise.
Signature verification process:
1. If len(ctx) > 255:
return error
2. Separate the keys and signatures.
(mldsaPK, tradPK) = DeserializePublicKey(pk)
(mldsaSig, tradSig) = DeserializeSignatureValue(s)
If an error occurs during deserialization, or if any of
the component keys or signature values are not of the
correct type or length for the given component algorithm,
then output "Invalid signature" and stop.
3. Compute a hash of the message.
As in FIPS 204, len(ctx) is encoded as a single unsigned byte.
M' = Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH( M )
4. Check each component signature individually, according to its
algorithm specification.
If any fail, then the entire signature validation fails.
if not ML-DSA.Verify( mldsaPK,
M',
mldsaSig,
mldsa_ctx=Label ) then
output "Invalid signature"
if not Trad.Verify( tradPK, M', tradSig ) then
output "Invalid signature"
if all succeeded, then
output "Valid signature"
Note that in Step 4 above, the function fails early if the first
component fails to verify. This is okay since there are no timing
attacks to consider as no private keys are involved in a signature
verification.
As with Composite-ML-DSA.Sign(), there are two different context
strings ctx at play: the application context ctx and the mldsa_ctx,
which behave the same in Verify() as they do in Sign().
4. Serialization
This section presents routines for serializing and deserializing
composite public keys, private keys, and signature values to bytes
via simple concatenation of the underlying encodings of the component
algorithms. The functions defined in this section are considered
internal implementation details and are referenced from within the
public API definitions in Section 3.
Deserialization is possible because ML-DSA has fixed-length public
keys, private keys (seeds), and signature values as shown in Table 1.
This table is similar to Table 2 in [FIPS.204], but with a different
private key representation.
+===========+============+=============+===========+
| Algorithm | Public key | Private key | Signature |
+===========+============+=============+===========+
| ML-DSA-44 | 1312 | 32 | 2420 |
+-----------+------------+-------------+-----------+
| ML-DSA-65 | 1952 | 32 | 3309 |
+-----------+------------+-------------+-----------+
| ML-DSA-87 | 2592 | 32 | 4627 |
+-----------+------------+-------------+-----------+
Table 1: ML-DSA Sizes in Bytes
While ML-DSA has a single fixed-size representation for each of
public key, private key (seed), and signature, a traditional
component algorithm might allow multiple valid encodings. For
example, standardized encodings exist for RSA keys both as a single
private exponent d or in Chinese Remainder Theorem from
Appendix A.1.2 of [RFC8017]. In order to obtain interoperability,
composite algorithms MUST use the following encodings of the
underlying components:
* *ML-DSA*: The private key MUST be the 32-byte seed value (ξ)
specified in Section 5.1 of [FIPS.204]. The signature and public
key format are encoded as specified in Section 7.2 of [FIPS.204].
* *RSA*: The public key MUST be encoded as RSAPublicKey with the
(n,e) public key representation as specified in Appendix A.1.1 of
[RFC8017] and the private key representation as RSAPrivateKey as
specified in Appendix A.1.2 of [RFC8017] with version 0 and
'otherPrimeInfos' absent. An RSA signature MUST be encoded as
specified in Sections 8.1.1 (for RSASSA-PSS-SIGN) or 8.2.1 (for
RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN) of [RFC8017].
* *ECDSA*: The public key MUST be encoded as an uncompressed X9.62
[X9.62_2005], including the leading byte 0x04 indicating
uncompressed. This is consistent with the encoding of ECPoint as
specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480] when no ASN.1 OCTET STRING
wrapping is present. A signature MUST be encoded as an Ecdsa-Sig-
Value as specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279]. The private key
MUST be encoded as ECPrivateKey as specified in [RFC5915] with the
'NamedCurve' parameter set to the OID of the curve, but without
the 'publicKey' field.
* *EdDSA*: The public key and signature MUST be encoded as per
Section 3 of [RFC8032], and the private key is a 32- or 57-byte
raw value for Ed25519 and Ed448, respectively, which can be
converted to a CurvePrivateKey as specified in [RFC8410] by the
addition of an OCTET STRING wrapper.
All ASN.1 objects SHALL be encoded using DER on serialization. For
all serialization routines below, when their output values are
required to be carried in an ASN.1 structure, they are wrapped as
described in Section 5.1.
Even with fixed encodings for the traditional component, there might
be slight differences in size of the encoded value due to, for
example, encoding rules that drop leading zeros. See Appendix A for
a table of maximum sizes for each composite algorithm and further
discussion of the reason for variations in these sizes.
The deserialization routines described below do not check for well-
formedness of the cryptographic material they are recovering. It is
assumed that underlying cryptographic primitives will catch malformed
values and raise an appropriate error.
4.1. SerializePublicKey and DeserializePublicKey
The serialization routine for keys simply concatenates the public
keys of the component signature algorithms, as defined below:
Composite-ML-DSA.SerializePublicKey(mldsaPK, tradPK) -> bytes
Explicit inputs:
mldsaPK The ML-DSA public key, which is bytes.
tradPK The traditional public key in the appropriate
encoding for the underlying component algorithm.
Implicit inputs:
None
Output:
bytes The encoded composite public key.
Serialization process:
1. Combine and output the encoded public key.
output mldsaPK || tradPK
Deserialization reverses this process. Each component key is
deserialized according to their respective specification as shown in
Appendix B.
The following describes how to instantiate a
DeserializePublicKey(bytes) function for a given composite algorithm
represented by <OID>.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.DeserializePublicKey(bytes)
-> (mldsaPK, tradPK)
Explicit inputs:
bytes An encoded composite public key.
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
ML-DSA The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and
parameter set to use, for example, "ML-DSA-65".
Output:
mldsaPK The ML-DSA public key, which is bytes.
tradPK The traditional public key in the appropriate
encoding for the underlying component algorithm.
Deserialization process:
1. Parse each constituent encoded public key.
The length of mldsaPK is known based on the
size of the ML-DSA component key length specified
by the OID.
switch ML-DSA do
case ML-DSA-44:
mldsaPK = bytes[:1312]
tradPK = bytes[1312:]
case ML-DSA-65:
mldsaPK = bytes[:1952]
tradPK = bytes[1952:]
case ML-DSA-87:
mldsaPK = bytes[:2592]
tradPK = bytes[2592:]
Note that while ML-DSA has fixed-length keys, RSA and
ECDSA may not, depending on encoding, so rigorous
length-checking of the overall composite key is not
always possible.
2. Output the component public keys.
output (mldsaPK, tradPK)
4.2. SerializePrivateKey and DeserializePrivateKey
The serialization routine for keys simply concatenates the private
keys of the component signature algorithms, as defined below:
Composite-ML-DSA.SerializePrivateKey(mldsaSeed, tradSK) -> bytes
Explicit inputs:
mldsaSeed The ML-DSA private key, which is the bytes of the seed.
tradSK The traditional private key in the appropriate
encoding for the underlying component algorithm.
Implicit inputs:
None
Output:
bytes The encoded composite private key.
Serialization process:
1. Combine and output the encoded private key.
output mldsaSeed || tradSK
Deserialization reverses this process. Each component key is
deserialized according to their respective specification as shown in
Appendix B.
The following describes how to instantiate a
DeserializePrivateKey(bytes) function. Since ML-DSA private keys are
32 bytes for all parameter sets, this function does not need to be
parameterized.
Composite-ML-DSA.DeserializePrivateKey(bytes) -> (mldsaSeed, tradSK)
Explicit inputs:
bytes An encoded composite private key.
Implicit inputs:
None
Output:
mldsaSeed The ML-DSA private key, which is the bytes of the seed.
tradSK The traditional private key in the appropriate
encoding for the underlying component algorithm.
Deserialization process:
1. Parse each constituent encoded key.
mldsaSeed = bytes[:32]
tradSK = bytes[32:]
Note that while ML-DSA has fixed-length keys, RSA and ECDSA
may not, depending on encoding, so rigorous length-checking
of the overall composite key is not always possible.
2. Output the component private keys.
output (mldsaSeed, tradSK)
4.3. SerializeSignatureValue and DeserializeSignatureValue
The serialization routine for the composite signature value simply
concatenates the fixed-length ML-DSA signature value with the
signature value from the traditional algorithm, as defined below:
Composite-ML-DSA.SerializeSignatureValue(mldsaSig, tradSig) -> bytes
Explicit inputs:
mldsaSig The ML-DSA signature value, which is bytes.
tradSig The traditional signature value in the appropriate
encoding for the underlying component algorithm.
Implicit inputs:
None
Output:
bytes The encoded composite signature value.
Serialization process:
1. Combine and output the encoded composite signature.
output mldsaSig || tradSig
Deserialization reverses this process, raising an error in the event
that the input is malformed. Each component signature is
deserialized according to their respective specification as shown in
Appendix B.
The following describes how to instantiate a
DeserializeSignatureValue(bytes) function for a given composite
algorithm represented by <OID>.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.DeserializeSignatureValue(bytes)
-> (mldsaSig, tradSig)
Explicit inputs:
bytes An encoded composite signature value.
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
ML-DSA The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set,
for example, "ML-DSA-65".
Output:
mldsaSig The ML-DSA signature value, which is bytes.
tradSig The traditional signature value in the appropriate
encoding for the underlying component algorithm.
Deserialization process:
1. Parse each constituent encoded signature.
The length of the mldsaSig is known based on the size of
the ML-DSA component signature length specified by the OID.
switch ML-DSA do
case ML-DSA-44:
mldsaSig = bytes[:2420]
tradSig = bytes[2420:]
case ML-DSA-65:
mldsaSig = bytes[:3309]
tradSig = bytes[3309:]
case ML-DSA-87:
mldsaSig = bytes[:4627]
tradSig = bytes[4627:]
Note that while ML-DSA has fixed-length signatures,
RSA and ECDSA may not, depending on encoding, so rigorous
length-checking is not always possible here.
2. Output the component signature values.
output (mldsaSig, tradSig)
5. Use Within X.509 and PKIX
This section, along with Sections 6 and 7, provides processing logic
and the ASN.1 modules necessary to use Composite ML-DSA within X.509
and PKIX protocols. Use within the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) will be covered in a separate specification.
While Composite ML-DSA keys and signature values MAY be used raw,
this section provides conventions for using them within X.509 and
other PKIX protocols such that Composite ML-DSA can be used as a
drop-in replacement for existing digital signature algorithms in PKCS
#10 [RFC2986], CMP [RFC9810], X.509 [RFC5280], and related protocols.
5.1. Encoding to DER
The serialization routines presented in Section 4 produce raw binary
values. When these values are required to be carried within a DER-
encoded message format such as an X.509's subjectPublicKey and
signatureValue BIT STRING [RFC5280] or a OneAsymmetricKey.privateKey
OCTET STRING [RFC5958], then the BIT STRING or OCTET STRING contains
this raw byte string output of the appropriate serialization routine
from Section 4 without further encoding.
When a Composite ML-DSA public key appears outside of a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type in an environment that uses ASN.1 encoding,
it could be encoded as an OCTET STRING by using the Composite-ML-DSA-
PublicKey type defined below.
Composite-ML-DSA-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
Size constraints MAY be enforced, as appropriate per Appendix A.
5.2. Key Usage Bits
The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage
certificate extension; see Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]. If the
keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that includes an OID
indicating a Composite ML-DSA algorithm in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
then the subject public key can only be used for verifying digital
signatures on certificates or CRLs, or those used in an entity
authentication service, a data origin authentication service, an
integrity service, and/or a non-repudiation service that protects
against the signing entity falsely denying some action. This means
that the keyUsage extension MUST have at least one of the following
bits set:
* digitalSignature
* nonRepudiation
* keyCertSign
* cRLSign
ML-DSA subject public keys cannot be used to establish keys or
encrypt data, so the keyUsage extension MUST NOT have any of the
following bits set:
* keyEncipherment
* dataEncipherment
* keyAgreement
* encipherOnly
* decipherOnly
Requirements about the keyUsage extension bits defined in [RFC5280]
still apply.
Composite ML-DSA keys MUST NOT be used in a "dual usage" mode because
even if the traditional component key supports both signing and
encryption, the post-quantum algorithms do not, and therefore, the
overall composite algorithm does not. Implementations MUST NOT use
one component of the composite for the purposes of digital signature
and the other component for the purposes of encryption or key
establishment.
5.3. ASN.1 Definitions
Composite ML-DSA uses a substantially non-ASN.1-based encoding, as
specified in Section 4. However, as composite algorithms will be
used within ASN.1-based X.509 and PKIX protocols, some conventions
for ASN.1 wrapping are necessary.
The following ASN.1 Information Object Classes are defined to allow
for compact definitions of each composite algorithm, leading to a
smaller overall ASN.1 module.
pk-CompositeSignature {OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id}
PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id
-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign,
cRLSign}
-- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
}
sa-CompositeSignature{OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id,
PUBLIC-KEY:publicKeyType }
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id
-- VALUE no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS {publicKeyType}
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id }
}
Figure 1: ASN.1 Information Object Classes for Composite ML-DSA
As an example, the public key and signature algorithm types
associated with id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 are defined as:
pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 }
sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256,
pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 }
The full set of key types defined by this specification can be found
in the ASN.1 module in Section 7.
Use cases that require an interoperable encoding for composite
private keys will often need to place a composite private key inside
a OneAsymmetricKey structure defined in [RFC5958], such as when
private keys are carried in PKCS #12 [RFC7292], CMP [RFC9810], or the
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211]. The definition
of OneAsymmetricKey is copied here for convenience:
OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version,
privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
privateKey PrivateKey,
attributes [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,
...,
[[2: publicKey [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],
...
}
...
PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
-- Content varies based on type of key. The
-- algorithm identifier dictates the format
-- of the key.
Figure 2: OneAsymmetricKey as Defined in RFC 5958
When a composite private key is conveyed inside a OneAsymmetricKey
structure (version 1 of which is also known as PrivateKeyInfo)
[RFC5958], the privateKeyAlgorithm field SHALL be set to the
corresponding composite algorithm identifier defined according to
Section 6, and its parameters field MUST be absent. The privateKey
field SHALL contain the OCTET STRING representation of the serialized
composite private key as per Section 4.2. The publicKey field
remains OPTIONAL. If the publicKey field is present, it MUST be a
composite public key as per Section 4.1.
Some applications might need to reconstruct the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
or OneAsymmetricKey objects corresponding to each component key
individually, for example, if this is required for invoking the
underlying primitive. Section 6 provides the necessary mapping
between composites and their component algorithms for doing this
reconstruction.
Component keys of a composite MUST NOT be used in any other type of
key or as a standalone key. For more details on the security
considerations around key reuse, see Section 9.3.
6. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
This section lists the algorithm identifiers and parameters for all
Composite ML-DSA algorithms.
Full specifications for the referenced algorithms can be found in
Appendix B.
As the number of algorithms can be daunting, implementers who wish to
implement only a single composite algorithm should see Section 10.4
for a discussion of the best algorithm for the most common use cases.
Labels are represented here as ASCII strings, but implementers MUST
convert them to byte strings according to their ASCII values prior to
concatenating them with other byte values as described in
Section 2.2.
id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.37
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA256
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-44
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: id-RSASSA-PSS
RSA size: 2048
RSASSA-PSS parameters: See Table 2.
id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.38
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA256
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-44
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA size: 2048
id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.39
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-44
Traditional algorithm: Ed25519
Traditional signature algorithm: id-Ed25519
id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.40
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA256
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-44
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
ECDSA curve: secp256r1
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.41
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: id-RSASSA-PSS
RSA size: 3072
RSASSA-PSS parameters: See Table 2.
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.42
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA size: 3072
id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.43
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: id-RSASSA-PSS
RSA size: 4096
RSASSA-PSS parameters: See Table 3.
id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.44
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
RSA size: 4096
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
ECDSA curve: secp256r1
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.46
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
ECDSA curve: secp384r1
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.47
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-BP256-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
ECDSA curve: brainpoolP256r1
id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.48
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-65
Traditional algorithm: Ed25519
Traditional signature algorithm: id-Ed25519
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.49
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-87
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
ECDSA curve: secp384r1
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.50
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA87-ECDSA-BP384-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-87
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
ECDSA curve: brainpoolP384r1
id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.51
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHAKE256/64 (see the "Note" at the end of
this section for more information)
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-87
Traditional algorithm: Ed448
Traditional signature algorithm: id-Ed448
id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.52
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-87
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: id-RSASSA-PSS
RSA size: 3072
RSASSA-PSS parameters: See Table 2.
id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.53
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-87
Traditional algorithm: RSA
Traditional signature algorithm: id-RSASSA-PSS
RSA size: 4096
RSASSA-PSS parameters: See Table 3.
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.54
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512
Pre-Hash function (PH): SHA512
ML-DSA variant: ML-DSA-87
Traditional algorithm: ECDSA
Traditional signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA512
ECDSA curve: secp521r1
For all RSA key types and sizes, the exponent is RECOMMENDED to be
65537. Implementations MAY support only 65537 and reject other
exponent values. Legacy RSA implementations that use other values
for the exponent MAY be used within a composite but need to be
careful when interoperating with other implementations.
| Note: The pre-hash functions were chosen to roughly match the
| security level of the stronger component. In the case of
| Ed25519 and Ed448, they match the hash functions defined in
| [RFC8032]: SHA512 for Ed25519ph and SHAKE256(x, 64), which is
| SHAKE256 producing 64 bytes (512 bits) of output, for Ed448ph.
6.1. RSASSA-PSS Parameters
Use of RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] requires extra parameters to be
specified.
The RSASSA-PSS-params ASN.1 type defined in [RFC8017] is not used in
Composite ML-DSA encodings since the parameter values are fixed by
this specification. However, in the table below, refer to the named
fields of the RSASSA-PSS-params ASN.1 type in order to provide a
mapping between the use of RSASSA-PSS in Composite ML-DSA and
[RFC8017].
When RSASSA-PSS is used at the 2048-bit or 3072-bit security level,
RSASSA-PSS SHALL be instantiated with the following parameters:
+=============================+===========+
| RSASSA-PSS-params field | Value |
+=============================+===========+
| hashAlgorithm | id-sha256 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| maskGenAlgorithm.algorithm | id-mgf1 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| maskGenAlgorithm.parameters | id-sha256 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| saltLength | 32 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| trailerField | 1 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
Table 2: RSASSA-PSS 2048 and 3072
Parameters
When RSASSA-PSS is used at the 4096-bit security level, RSASSA-PSS
SHALL be instantiated with the following parameters:
+=============================+===========+
| RSASSA-PSS-params field | Value |
+=============================+===========+
| hashAlgorithm | id-sha384 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| maskGenAlgorithm.algorithm | id-mgf1 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| maskGenAlgorithm.parameters | id-sha384 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| saltLength | 48 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
| trailerField | 1 |
+-----------------------------+-----------+
Table 3: RSASSA-PSS 4096 Parameters
7. ASN.1 Module
This section includes the ASN.1 module [X.680] for Composite ML-DSA
and uses the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690]. This module imports objects from
[RFC5912].
<CODE STARTS>
Composite-MLDSA-2025
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-composite-mldsa-2025(127) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS, AlgorithmIdentifier{}
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5912
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
;
--
-- Object Identifiers
--
--
-- Information Object Classes
--
pk-CompositeSignature {OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id}
PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id
-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign,
cRLSign}
-- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
}
sa-CompositeSignature{OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id,
PUBLIC-KEY:publicKeyType }
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id
-- VALUE no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS {publicKeyType}
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id }
}
-- Composite ML-DSA
id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 37 }
pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256}
sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256,
pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 }
id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 38 }
pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256}
sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256,
pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 }
id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 39 }
pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 40 }
pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256}
sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256,
pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 }
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 41 }
pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 42 }
pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 43 }
pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 44 }
pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 45 }
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 46 }
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 47 }
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 48 }
pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 49 }
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 50 }
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 51 }
pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256}
sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256,
pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 }
id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 52 }
pk-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 53 }
pk-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 }
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 54 }
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::=
pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512}
sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
sa-CompositeSignature{
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 }
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912
sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 |
sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 |
sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 |
sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 |
sa-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |
sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,
... }
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
-- This expands PublicKeyAlgorithms from RFC 5912
pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 |
pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 |
pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 |
pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 |
pk-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |
pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512,
...
}
END
<CODE ENDS>
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Module Registration
IANA has registered the following in the "SMI Security for PKIX
Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
+=========+=============================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+=============================+===========+
| 127 | id-mod-composite-mldsa-2025 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------+-----------+
Table 4: New Registration in SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier Registry
8.2. Object Identifier Registrations
IANA has registered the following in the "SMI Security for PKIX
Algorithms" registry:
+=========+=========================================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+=========================================+===========+
| 37 | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 38 | id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 39 | id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 40 | id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 41 | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 42 | id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 43 | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 44 | id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 45 | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 46 | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 47 | id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 48 | id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 49 | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 50 | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 51 | id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 52 | id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 53 | id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| 54 | id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 | RFC 10073 |
+---------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 5: New Registrations in SMI Security for PKIX
Algorithms Registry
9. Security Considerations
As this specification uses ML-DSA as a component of all composite
algorithms, all security considerations from [RFC9881] apply.
9.1. Why Hybrids?
In broad terms, a PQ/T hybrid can be used either to provide dual-
algorithm security or to provide migration flexibility. Both are
discussed below.
* *Dual-algorithm security*: The general idea is that the data is
protected by two algorithms such that an adversary would need to
break both in order to compromise the data. As with most of
cryptography, this property is easy to state in general terms, but
it becomes more complicated when expressed in formalisms.
Section 9.2 goes into more detail. One common counter-argument
against PQ/T hybrid signatures is that if an adversary can forge
one of the component algorithms, then why attack the hybrid-signed
message at all when they could simply forge a completely new
message? The answer to this question must be found outside the
cryptographic primitives themselves, and instead in policy; once
an algorithm is known to be broken, it ought to be disallowed for
single-algorithm use by cryptographic policy. Meanwhile, hybrids
involving that algorithm may continue to be used and to provide
value, motivated by the fact that when the composite public key is
trusted by the verifier but the component keys in isolation are
not, a successful attack would require the adversary to forge both
halves of the composite signature.
* *Migration flexibility*: Some PQ/T hybrids exist to provide a sort
of "OR" mode, where the application can choose to use one
algorithm or the other, or both. The intention is that the PQ/T
hybrid mechanism builds in application backwards compatibility to
allow legacy and upgraded applications to coexist and communicate.
The composites presented in this specification do not provide this
since they operate in a strict "AND" mode. They do, however,
provide codebase migration flexibility. Consider that an
organization has today a mature, validated, certified, hardened
implementation of RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC);
composites allow them to add an ML-DSA implementation that
immediately starts providing benefits against long-term document
integrity attacks even if that ML-DSA implementation is still an
experimental, non-validated, non-certified, non-hardened
implementation. More details of obtaining FIPS certification of a
composite algorithm can be found in Section 10.2.
9.2. EUF-CMA, SUF-CMA, and Non-Separability
First, a note about the security model under which this analysis is
performed. This specification strictly forbids reusing component key
material between composite and non-composite keys or between multiple
composite keys. This specification also exists within the X.509 PKI
architecture where trust in a public verification key is assumed to
be established either directly via a trust store or via a certificate
chain. That said, these are both policy mechanisms that are outside
the formal definitions of EUF-CMA and SUF-CMA under which a signature
primitive must be analyzed; therefore, this section considers attacks
that may be mitigated partially or completely within a strictly
implemented PKI setting but that need to be considered when
considering Composite ML-DSA as a general-purpose signature primitive
that could be used outside of the X.509 setting.
The second security model consideration is that composites are
designed to provide value even if one algorithm is broken, even if
you do not know which. However, the security properties offered by
the composite signature can differ based on which algorithm you
consider to be broken.
9.2.1. EUF-CMA
A signature algorithm has Existential Unforgeability under Chosen
Message Attack (EUF-CMA) if an adversary that has access to a signing
oracle cannot create a message-signature pair (M, Sig) that would be
accepted by the verifier for any message M that was not an input to a
signing oracle query.
In general, Composite ML-DSA will be EUF-CMA secure if at least one
of the component algorithms is EUF-CMA secure and PH is collision
resistant. Any algorithm that creates an existential forgery (M,
(mldsaSig, tradSig)) for Composite ML-DSA can be converted into a
pair of algorithms that will create either existential forgeries (M',
mldsaSig) and (M', tradSig) for the component algorithms or a
collision in PH.
However, the nature of the EUF-CMA security guarantee can still
change if one of the component algorithms is broken:
* If the traditional component is broken, then Composite ML-DSA will
remain EUF-CMA secure against quantum adversaries.
* If ML-DSA is broken, then Composite ML-DSA will only be EUF-CMA
secure against classical adversaries.
The same properties will hold for X.509 certificates that use
Composite ML-DSA: A classical adversary cannot forge a Composite ML-
DSA signed certificate if at least one component algorithm is
classically EUF-CMA secure, and a quantum adversary cannot forge a
Composite ML-DSA signed certificate if ML-DSA remains quantumly EUF-
CMA secure.
9.2.2. SUF-CMA
A signature algorithm has Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message
Attack (SUF-CMA) if an adversary that has access to a signing oracle
cannot create a message-signature pair (M, Sig) that is not an output
of a signing oracle query. This is a stronger property than EUF-CMA
since the message M does not need to be different. SUF-CMA security
is also more complicated for Composite ML-DSA than EUF-CMA.
A SUF-CMA failure in one component algorithm can lead to a SUF-CMA
failure in the composite. For example, an ECDSA signature can be
trivially modified to produce a different signature that is still
valid for the same message, and this property passes directly through
to Composite ML-DSA with ECDSA.
Unfortunately, it is not generally sufficient for both component
algorithms to be SUF-CMA secure. If repeated calls to the signing
oracle produce two valid message-signature pairs (M, (mldsaSig1,
tradSig1)) and (M, (mldsaSig2, tradSig2)) for the same message M, but
where mldsaSig1 != mldsaSig2 and tradSig1 != tradSig2, then the
adversary can construct a third pair (M, (mldsaSig1, tradSig2)) that
will also be valid.
Nevertheless, Composite ML-DSA will not be SUF-CMA secure, and
Composite ML-DSA signed X.509 certificates will not be strongly
unforgeable, against quantum adversaries since a quantum adversary
will be able to break the SUF-CMA security of the traditional
component.
Consequently, applications where SUF-CMA security is critical SHOULD
NOT use Composite ML-DSA.
9.2.3. Non-Separability
Weak Non-Separability (WNS) of a hybrid signature is defined in
Section 1.3.3 of [RFC9955] as the guarantee that an adversary cannot
simply "remove" one of the component signatures without evidence left
behind.
Strong Non-Separability (SNS) is the stronger notion that an
adversary cannot take a hybrid signature and produce a component
signature, with a potentially different message, that will be
accepted by the component verifier.
Composite ML-DSA signs a message M by passing M' as defined in
Section 2.2 to the component signature primitives. Consider an
adversary that takes a composite signature (M, (mldsaSig, tradSig))
and splits it into the component signatures (M', mldsaSig) and (M',
tradSig). On the traditional side, (M', tradSig) will verify
correctly, but the static Prefix defined in Section 2.2 remains as
evidence of the original composite. On the ML-DSA side, (M',
mldsaSig) is signed with ML-DSA's context value equal to the
composite algorithm's Label, so it will fail to verify under ML-
DSA.Verify(M', ctx=""). Consequently, Composite ML-DSA will provide
WNS for both components and a limited form of SNS for the ML-DSA
component. It can achieve stronger non-separability in practice for
both components if the prefix-based mitigation described in
Section 9.4 is applied.
When used within X.509, the Label representing the signature
algorithm is included in the signed object so if one of the component
signatures is removed from the Composite ML-DSA signature, then the
signed-over Label will still indicate the composite algorithm, and
this will fail at the X.509 processing layer. Composite ML-DSA
therefore provides a version of SNS for X.509. The prohibition on
key reuse between composite and single-algorithm contexts discussed
in Section 9.3 further strengthens the non-separability in practice.
9.3. Key Reuse
When using single-algorithm cryptography, the best practice is to
always generate fresh key material for each purpose, for example,
when renewing a certificate or obtaining both a TLS and S/MIME
certificate for the same device. However, in practice, key reuse in
such scenarios is not always catastrophic to security and therefore
is often tolerated. But this reasoning does not hold in the PQ/T
hybrid setting where key reuse fundamentally undermines the security
of the hybrid scheme.
Within the broader context of PQ/T hybrids, there are new attack
surfaces that arise due to the hybrid constructions that did not
exist in single-algorithm contexts. One of these is key reuse where
the component keys within a hybrid are also used by themselves within
a single-algorithm context. For example, it might be tempting for an
operator to take an already deployed RSA key pair and combine it with
an ML-DSA key pair to form a hybrid key pair for use in a hybrid
algorithm. Within a hybrid signature context, this leads to a class
of attacks referred to as "stripping attacks" (discussed in
Section 9.2) and may also open up risks from further cross-protocol
attacks. Despite the weak non-separability property offered by the
composite signature combiner, key reuse MUST be avoided to prevent
the introduction of EUF-CMA vulnerabilities.
In addition, there is a further implication to key reuse regarding
certificate revocation. Upon receiving a new certificate enrollment
request, many certification authorities (CAs) will check if the
requested public key has been previously revoked due to key
compromise. Often, a CA will perform this check by using the public
key hash. Therefore, if one, or even both, components of a composite
have been previously revoked, the CA may only check the hash of the
combined composite key and not find the revocations. Therefore,
because the possibility of key reuse exists even though it is
forbidden in this specification, CAs performing revocation checks on
a composite key SHOULD also check both component keys independently
to verify that the component keys have not been revoked.
The risks of key reuse can be somewhat mitigated, but not eliminated,
by using an appropriate ctx value. For example, an application might
use ctx=Foobar-dual-cert-sig to indicate that this signature belongs
to the Foobar protocol [RFC3092] where two certificates were used to
create a single composite signature. This specification does not
endorse such uses, and per-application security analysis is needed to
determine the extent to which this provides mitigation, if any.
9.4. Use of Prefix for Attack Mitigation
The Prefix value specified in Section 2.2 allows for cautious
implementers to wrap their existing traditional Verify()
implementations with a guard that looks for messages starting with
this string and fails with an error -- i.e., this can act as an extra
protection against taking a composite signature and splitting it back
into components. However, an implementation that does this will be
unable to perform a traditional signature and verification on a
message that happens to start with this string.
9.5. Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms
Traditionally, a public key or certificate contains a single
cryptographic algorithm. If and when an algorithm becomes deprecated
(for example, RSA-512 or SHA1), the path to deprecating it through
policy and removing it from operational environments is, at least in
principle, straightforward.
In the composite model, this is less obvious since a PQ/T hybrid is
expected to still be considered valid after the traditional component
is deprecated for individual use. As such, a single composite public
key or certificate may contain a mixture of deprecated and non-
deprecated algorithms. In general, this should be manageable through
policy by removing OIDs for the standalone component algorithms while
still allowing OIDs for composite algorithms. However, complications
may arise when the composite implementation needs to invoke the
cryptographic module for a deprecated component algorithm. In
particular, this could lead to complex Cryptographic Bills of
Materials that show implementations of deprecated algorithms still
present and being used.
10. Operational Considerations
10.1. Rationale for Choices
In generating the list of composite algorithms, the idea was to
provide composite algorithms at various security levels with varying
performance characteristics.
The main design consideration in choosing pairings is to prioritize
providing pairings of each ML-DSA security level with commonly
deployed traditional algorithms. This supports the design goal of
using composites as a stepping stone to efficiently deploy post-
quantum on top of existing hardened and certified traditional
algorithm implementations. This was prioritized rather than
attempting to exactly match the security level of the post-quantum
and traditional components, which in general is difficult to do since
there is no academic consensus on how to compare the "bits of
security" against classical adversaries and "qubits of security"
against quantum adversaries.
SHA2 is prioritized over SHA3 in order to facilitate implementations
that do not have easy access to SHA3 outside of the ML-DSA module.
However, SHAKE256 is used with Ed448 since this is already the
recommended hash function chosen for Ed448ph in [RFC8032].
In some cases, multiple hash functions are used within the same
composite algorithm. Consider, for example, id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-
P256-SHA512, which requires SHA512 as the overall composite pre-hash
in order to maintain the security level of ML-DSA-65 but uses SHA256
within the ecdsa-with-SHA256 with secp256r1 traditional component.
While this increases the implementation burden of needing to carry
multiple hash functions for a single composite algorithm, this aligns
with the design goal of choosing commonly implemented traditional
algorithms, since ecdsa-with-SHA256 with secp256r1 is far more common
than, for example, ecdsa-with-SHA512 with secp256r1.
Full specifications for the referenced algorithms can be found in
Appendix B.
10.2. FIPS Certification
This section gives guidance to implementers wishing to certify a
composite implementation under the Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) program run by US NIST.
This guidance is not authoritative and has not been endorsed by US
NIST.
One of the primary design goals of this specification is for the
overall composite algorithm to be able to be considered FIPS approved
even when one of the component algorithms is not.
Implementers seeking FIPS certification of a composite signature
algorithm where only one of the component algorithms has been FIPS
validated or FIPS approved should credit the FIPS-validated component
algorithm with full security strength, the non-FIPS-validated
component algorithm with zero security, and the overall composite
should be considered at least as strong and thus FIPS approved.
The composite algorithm has been designed to treat the underlying
primitives as immutable implementations and not impose any additional
requirements on them that could require an existing implementation of
an underlying primitive to run in a mode different from the one under
which it was certified. For example, the KeyGen() defined in
Section 3.1 invokes ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(seed), which might not be
available in a cryptographic module running in FIPS mode, but the
process in Section 3.1 is only a suggestion, and the Composite ML-DSA
key generation MAY be implemented using a different available
interface for ML-DSA.KeyGen(). However, using an interface that does
not support a seed will prevent the implementation from encoding the
private key according to Section 4.2. Another example is pre-
hashing; a pre-hash is inherent to RSA, ECDSA, and ML-DSA (μ), and a
composite makes no assumptions or requirements about whether
component-specific pre-hashing is done locally as part of the
composite or remotely as part of the component primitive.
Note also that Section 3.1 depicts the generation of the seed as
mldsaSeed = Random(); when implementing this for FIPS certification,
this MUST be the direct output of a FIPS-approved Deterministic
Random Bit Generator (DRBG).
Note that composite algorithms provide a design pattern to provide
utility in future situations that require care to remain FIPS
compliant, such as future cryptographic migrations, as well as
bridging across jurisdictions with non-intersecting cryptographic
requirements.
10.3. Backwards Compatibility
The mechanisms specified in this document explicitly do not provide
application backwards compatibility; only upgraded systems will
understand the OIDs defined in this specification.
If application backwards compatibility is required, then additional
mechanisms will be needed. Migration and interoperability concerns
need to be thought about in the context of various types of protocols
that make use of X.509 and PKIX with relation to digital signature
objects, from online negotiated protocols such as TLS 1.3 [RFC9846]
and IKEv2 [RFC7296] to non-negotiated asynchronous protocols such as
S/MIME signed email [RFC8551], document signing such as in the
context of the European eIDAS regulations [eIDAS2014], and publicly
trusted code signing [codesigningbrsv3.8], as well as myriad other
standardized and proprietary protocols and applications that leverage
CMS [RFC5652] signed structures. Composites simplify the protocol
design work because they can be implemented as a signature algorithm
that fits into existing systems.
10.4. Profiling Down the Number of Options
One daunting aspect of this specification is the number of composite
algorithm combinations. Each option has been specified because there
is a community that has a direct application for it; typically, this
is because the traditional component is already deployed in a change-
managed environment or because that specific traditional component is
required for regulatory reasons.
However, this large number of combinations leads to fracturing of the
ecosystem into non-interoperable subgroups when different communities
choose non-overlapping subsets to support, or it leads to spreading
development resources too thin when trying to support all options.
This specification does not list any particular composite algorithm
as mandatory to implement; however, organizations that operate within
specific application domains are encouraged to define profiles that
select a small number of composites appropriate for that application
domain.
For applications that do not have any regulatory requirements or
legacy implementations to consider, it is RECOMMENDED to focus
implementation effort on the following composite algorithm, as it
provides the best overall balance of performance and security:
id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512
Listed below are a few other recommendations for specific scenarios.
In applications that require RSA, it is RECOMMENDED to focus
implementation effort on:
id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512
In applications that are performance and bandwidth sensitive, it is
RECOMMENDED to focus implementation effort on:
id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
or
id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512
In applications that only allow NIST PQC Level 5, it is RECOMMENDED
to focus implementation effort on:
id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512
In applications that require the signature primitive to provide SUF-
CMA, it is RECOMMENDED to focus implementation effort on:
id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512
10.5. External Pre-Hashing
Implementers MAY externalize the pre-hash computation outside the
module that computes Composite-ML-DSA.Sign() in an analogous way to
how pre-hash signing is used for RSA, ECDSA, or HashML-DSA. Such a
modification to the Composite-ML-DSA.Sign() algorithm is considered
compliant to this specification so long as it produces the same
output and error conditions.
Below is a suggested implementation for splitting the pre-hashing and
signing between two parties.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Prehash(M) -> ph
Explicit inputs:
M The message to be signed, an octet string.
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
PH The hash function to use for pre-hashing.
Output:
ph The pre-hash, which equals PH ( M )
Process:
1. Compute the pre-hash of the message using the hash function
defined by PH:
ph = PH ( M )
2. Output ph.
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign_ph(sk, ph, ctx) -> s
Explicit inputs:
sk Composite private key consisting of signing private keys
for each component.
ph The pre-hash digest over the message.
ctx The message context string used in the composite
signature combiner, which defaults to the empty string.
Implicit inputs mapped from <OID>:
ML-DSA The underlying ML-DSA algorithm and parameter set, for
example, "ML-DSA-65".
Trad The underlying traditional algorithm and
parameter set, for example, "sha256WithRSAEncryption"
or "Ed25519".
Prefix The prefix octet string.
Label A signature label that is specific to each composite
algorithm. Additionally, the composite label is passed
into the underlying ML-DSA primitive as the ctx.
Signature Label values are defined in the
"Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters" section.
Process:
1. Identical to Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign (sk, M, ctx) but
replace the internally generated PH( M ) from Step 2 of
Composite-ML-DSA<OID>.Sign (sk, M, ctx) with ph, which is
input into this function.
10.6. Interoperability of Legacy Algorithms
The legacy component algorithms, particularly RSA and ECDSA, can
themselves have interoperability issues that will propagate to become
interoperability issues in the composite. For example, an RSA
exponent of 65537 is RECOMMENDED in this specification, but other
values are possible.
Implementations are encouraged to be lenient when parsing the key
material of the legacy algorithm. In particular, the recommendation
is to use existing implementations of the legacy algorithms that
already handle all the variation seen in the wild.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[FIPS.186-5]
NIST, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS 186-5,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5, February 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf>.
[FIPS.202] NIST, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
Extendable-Output Functions", NIST FIPS 202,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[FIPS.204] NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
NIST FIPS 204, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204, August 2024,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, May 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5639] Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation",
RFC 5639, DOI 10.17487/RFC5639, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5639>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5758] Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.
Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
RFC 5758, DOI 10.17487/RFC5758, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5758>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8410] Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for
Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 8410,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8410>.
[RFC9881] Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9881>.
[SEC1] Certicom Research, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
May 2009, <https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[SEC2] Certicom Research, "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve
Domain Parameters", January 2010,
<https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>.
[X9.62_2005]
American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
ANSI X9.62:2005, November 2005.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.
11.2. Informative References
[ANSSI2024]
French Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI), Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI), Netherlands National
Communications Security Agency (NLNCSA), and Swedish
National Communications Security Authority, Swedish Armed
Forces, "Position Paper on Quantum Key Distribution",
<https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/
Quantum_Key_Distribution_Position_Paper.pdf>.
[Bindel2017]
Bindel, N., Herath, U., McKague, M., and D. Stebila,
"Transitioning to a quantum-resistant public key
infrastructure", Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto
2017), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10346, pp.
384-405, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_22, 2017,
<https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_22>.
[BSI2021] Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), "Quantum-
safe cryptography - fundamentals, current developments and
recommendations", May 2021,
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/
Publications/Brochure/quantum-safe-cryptography.pdf>.
[codesigningbrsv3.8]
CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing
Certificates", Version 3.8.0, August 2024,
<https://cabforum.org/working-groups/code-signing/
documents/>.
[eIDAS2014]
European Parliament, Council of the European Union,
"Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic
identification and trust services for electronic
transactions in the internal market and repealing
Directive 1999/93/EC", July 2014,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj/eng>.
[RFC3092] Eastlake 3rd, D., Manros, C., and E. Raymond, "Etymology
of "Foo"", RFC 3092, DOI 10.17487/RFC3092, April 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3092>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC7292] Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A.,
and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8411] Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, "IANA Registration for the
Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range",
RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8411>.
[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
[RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9180>.
[RFC9794] Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9794>.
[RFC9810] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 9810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9810, July 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9810>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.
[RFC9955] Bindel, N., Hale, B., Connolly, D., and F. Driscoll,
"Hybrid Signature Spectrums", RFC 9955,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9955, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9955>.
[RFC9958] Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
Engineers", RFC 9958, DOI 10.17487/RFC9958, June 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9958>.
[TestVectors]
"Test vectors for Composite-ML-DSA", commit f0627ab, 7
January 2026, <https://github.com/lamps-wg/draft-
composite-sigs/tree/main/src>.
Appendix A. Maximum Key and Signature Sizes
The sizes listed below are maximums. Several factors could cause
fluctuations in the size of the traditional component. For example:
* The RSA public key (n, e) allows e to vary in size between 3 and n
- 1 [RFC8017]. Note that the size table below assumes the
recommended value of e = 65537, so for RSA combinations, it is in
fact not a true maximum.
* When the underlying RSA or EC value is itself DER encoded, integer
values could occasionally be shorter than expected due to leading
zeros being dropped from the encoding.
Size values marked with an asterisk (*) in the table below are not
fixed but are maximum possible values for the composite key or
signature. Implementations should be careful when performing length
checking based on such values.
Non-hybrid ML-DSA is included for reference.
+=========================================+======+=======+=========+
| Algorithm |Public|Private|Signature|
| |key |key | |
+=========================================+======+=======+=========+
| id-ML-DSA-44 |1312 |32 |2420 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-ML-DSA-65 |1952 |32 |3309 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-ML-DSA-87 |2592 |32 |4627 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 |1582* |1226* |2676 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 |1582* |1226* |2676 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 |1344 |64 |2484 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 |1377 |83 |2492* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |2350* |1802* |3693 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA512 |2350* |1802* |3693 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |2478* |2383* |3821 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-RSA4096-PKCS15-SHA512 |2478* |2383* |3821 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 |2017 |83 |3381* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |2049 |96 |3413* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA512 |2017 |84 |3381* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 |1984 |64 |3373 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA512 |2689 |96 |4731* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA512 |2689 |100 |4731* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 |2649 |89 |4741 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA87-RSA3072-PSS-SHA512 |2990* |1802* |5011 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA87-RSA4096-PSS-SHA512 |3118* |2383* |5139 |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
| id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P521-SHA512 |2725 |114 |4766* |
+-----------------------------------------+------+-------+---------+
Table 6: Maximum Size Values of Composite ML-DSA
Appendix B. Component Algorithm Reference
This section provides references to the full specification of the
algorithms used in the composite constructions.
+=========================+=========================+=============+
| Component Signature | OID |Specification|
| Algorithm ID | | |
+=========================+=========================+=============+
| id-ML-DSA-44 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.17 |[FIPS.204] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| id-ML-DSA-65 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18 |[FIPS.204] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| id-ML-DSA-87 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19 |[FIPS.204] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| id-Ed25519 | 1.3.101.112 |[RFC8032], |
| | |[RFC8410] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| id-Ed448 | 1.3.101.113 |[RFC8032], |
| | |[RFC8410] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| ecdsa-with-SHA256 | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 |[RFC3279], |
| | |[RFC5915], |
| | |[RFC5758], |
| | |[RFC5480], |
| | |[SEC1], |
| | |[X9.62_2005] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| ecdsa-with-SHA384 | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 |[RFC3279], |
| | |[RFC5915], |
| | |[RFC5758], |
| | |[RFC5480], |
| | |[SEC1], |
| | |[X9.62_2005] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| ecdsa-with-SHA512 | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 |[RFC3279], |
| | |[RFC5915], |
| | |[RFC5758], |
| | |[RFC5480], |
| | |[SEC1], |
| | |[X9.62_2005] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| sha256WithRSAEncryption | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 |[RFC8017] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| sha384WithRSAEncryption | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 |[RFC8017] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| id-RSASSA-PSS | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 |[RFC8017] |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
Table 7: Component Signature Algorithms Used in Composite
Constructions
+==================+=======================+===================+
| Elliptic CurveID | OID | Specification |
+==================+=======================+===================+
| secp256r1 | 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 | [RFC6090], [SEC2] |
+------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+
| secp384r1 | 1.3.132.0.34 | [RFC5480], |
| | | [RFC6090], [SEC2] |
+------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+
| secp521r1 | 1.3.132.0.35 | [RFC5480], |
| | | [RFC6090], [SEC2] |
+------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+
| brainpoolP256r1 | 1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7 | [RFC5639] |
+------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+
| brainpoolP384r1 | 1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11 | [RFC5639] |
+------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+
Table 8: Elliptic Curves Used in Composite Constructions
+=============+=========================+===============+
| HashID | OID | Specification |
+=============+=========================+===============+
| id-sha256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 | [RFC6234] |
+-------------+-------------------------+---------------+
| id-sha384 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2 | [RFC6234] |
+-------------+-------------------------+---------------+
| id-sha512 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 | [RFC6234] |
+-------------+-------------------------+---------------+
| id-shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | [FIPS.202] |
+-------------+-------------------------+---------------+
| id-mgf1 | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.8 | [RFC8017] |
+-------------+-------------------------+---------------+
Table 9: Hash Algorithms Used in Pre-Hashed Composite
Constructions to Build PH Elements
Appendix C. Component AlgorithmIdentifiers for Public Keys and
Signatures
Many cryptographic libraries are X.509 focused and do not expose
interfaces to instantiate a public key from raw bytes, but only from
a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as you would find in an X.509
certificate; therefore, implementing a composite in those libraries
requires reconstructing the SPKI for each component algorithm. In
order to aid implementers and reduce interoperability issues, this
section lists out the full public key and signature
AlgorithmIdentifiers for each component algorithm.
For newer algorithms like Ed25519 or ML-DSA, the AlgorithmIdentifiers
are the same for Public Key and Signature. Older algorithms have
different AlgorithmIdentifiers for keys and signatures and are
specified separately here for each component.
*ML-DSA-44*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ML-DSA-44 -- (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 17)
}
DER:
30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 03 11
*ML-DSA-65*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ML-DSA-65 -- (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 18)
}
DER:
30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 03 12
*ML-DSA-87*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ML-DSA-87 -- (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 19)
}
DER:
30 0B 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 03 13
*RSASSA-PSS 2048 & 3072*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
Note that it is suggested here to use id-RSASSA-PSS
(1.2.840.113549.1.1.10) as the public key OID for RSASSA-PSS,
although most implementations also would accept rsaEncryption
(1.2.840.113549.1.1.1), and some might in fact prefer or require it.
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)
}
DER:
30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha256, -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)
parameters NULL
},
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.8)
parameters AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha256, -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1)
parameters NULL
}
},
saltLength 32
}
}
DER:
30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0
0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00
A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 A2 03
02 01 20
*RSASSA-PSS 4096*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)
}
DER:
30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.10)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha384, -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2)
parameters NULL
},
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.8)
parameters AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha384, -- (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2)
parameters NULL
}
},
saltLength 48
}
}
DER:
30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0
0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00
A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 A2 03
02 01 30
*RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 2048 & 3072*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm rsaEncryption, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
parameters NULL
}
DER:
30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm sha256WithRSAEncryption, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
parameters NULL
}
DER:
30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0D 05 00
*RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 4096*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm rsaEncryption, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
parameters NULL
}
DER:
30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm sha384WithRSAEncryption, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.1.12)
parameters NULL
}
DER:
30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0C 05 00
*ECDSA NIST P256*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ecPublicKey -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm secp256r1 -- (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
}
}
}
DER:
30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
}
DER:
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02
*ECDSA NIST P384*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ecPublicKey -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm secp384r1 -- (1.3.132.0.34)
}
}
}
DER:
30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 04 00 22
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA384 -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.3)
}
DER:
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 03
*ECDSA NIST P521*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ecPublicKey -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm secp521r1 -- (1.3.132.0.35)
}
}
}
DER:
30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 04 00 23
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA512 -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.4)
}
DER:
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 04
*ECDSA Brainpool-P256*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ecPublicKey -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm brainpoolP256r1 -- (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7)
}
}
}
DER:
30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03
03 02 08 01 01 07
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
}
DER:
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02
*ECDSA Brainpool-P384*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-ecPublicKey -- (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
parameters ANY ::= {
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm brainpoolP384r1 -- (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11)
}
}
}
DER:
30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03
03 02 08 01 01 0B
AlgorithmIdentifier of Signature
ASN.1:
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA384 -- (1.2.840.10045.4.3.3)
}
DER:
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 03
*Ed25519*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-Ed25519 -- (1.3.101.112)
}
DER:
30 05 06 03 2B 65 70
*Ed448*
AlgorithmIdentifier of Public Key and Signature
ASN.1:
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-Ed448 -- (1.3.101.113)
}
DER:
30 05 06 03 2B 65 71
Appendix D. Message Representative Examples
This section provides examples of constructing the message
representative M', showing all intermediate values. This is intended
to be useful for debugging purposes.
The input message for this example is the hex string "00 01 02 03 04
05 06 07 08 09".
Each input component is shown. Note that values are shown as hex
encoded for display purposes only; they are actually raw binary
values.
* Prefix is the fixed constant defined in Section 2.2.
* Label is the specific signature label for this composite
algorithm, as defined in Section 6.
* len(ctx) is the length of the message context string, which is 00
when no context is used.
* ctx is the message context string used in the composite signature
combiner. It is empty in this example.
* PH(M) is the output of hashing the message M.
Finally, the fully assembled M' is given, which is simply the
concatenation of the above values.
First is an example of constructing the message representative M' for
MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 without a context string ctx.
Example of id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 construction of M'.
# Inputs:
M: 00010203040506070809
ctx: <empty>
# Components of M':
Prefix:
436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e61747572657332303235
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512
len(ctx): 00
ctx: <empty>
PH(M): 0f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c3523a20974f
9a3f202f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d854c342f90353
3
# Outputs:
# M' = Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH(M)
M': 436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e6174757265733230323
5434f4d505349472d4d4c44534136352d45434453412d503235362d534841353132
000f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c3523a20974f9a3f2
02f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d854c342f903533
Second is an example of constructing the message representative M'
for MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 with a context string ctx.
The inputs are similar to the first example with the exception that
there is an 8-byte context string 'ctx'.
Example of id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512 construction of M'.
# Inputs:
M: 00010203040506070809
ctx: 0813061205162623
# Components of M':
Prefix:
436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e61747572657332303235
Label: COMPSIG-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA512
len(ctx): 08
ctx: 0813061205162623
PH(M): 0f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c3523a20974f
9a3f202f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d854c342f90353
3
# Outputs:
# M' = Prefix || Label || len(ctx) || ctx || PH(M)
M': 436f6d706f73697465416c676f726974686d5369676e6174757265733230323
5434f4d505349472d4d4c44534136352d45434453412d503235362d534841353132
0808130612051626230f89ee1fcb7b0a4f7809d1267a029719004c5a5e5ec323a7c
3523a20974f9a3f202f56fadba4cd9e8d654ab9f2e96dc5c795ea176fa20ede8d85
4c342f903533
Appendix E. Test Vectors
The following test vectors are provided in a format similar to the
NIST Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol (ACVP) Known Answer
Tests (KATs).
The structure is that a global message m is signed over in all test
cases. m is the ASCII string "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy
dog."
For all test vectors, one sample signature is provided that was
computed over an empty ctx string, and one computed over the ctx
string "The lethargic, colorless dog sat beneath the energetic,
stationary fox."
Each test case has the following values:
tcId: the name of the algorithm.
pk: the raw verification public key.
x5c: a self-signed X.509 certificate of the public key.
sk: the raw signature private key.
sk_pkcs8: the signature private key in a PKCS #8 object.
s: the signature value computed over m with an empty ctx string.
sWithContext: the signature value computed over m with the provided
ctx string.
Implementers should be able to perform the following tests using the
test vectors below:
1. Load the public key pk or certificate x5c and use it to verify
the signature s over the message m.
2. Validate the self-signed certificate x5c.
3. Load the signing private key sk or sk_pkcs8 and use it to produce
a new signature that can be verified using the provided pk or
x5c.
Test vectors are provided for each underlying ML-DSA algorithm in
isolation for the purposes of debugging.
Due to the length of the test vectors, some readers will prefer to
retrieve the copy from GitHub that is not word wrapped [TestVectors].
The reference implementation written in Python that generated them is
also available.
{
"m": "VGhlIHF1aWNrIGJyb3duIGZveCBqdW1wcyBvdmVyIHRoZSBsYXp5IGRvZy4=",
"ctx": "VGhlIGxldGhhcmdpYywgY29sb3JsZXNzIGRvZyBzYXQgYmVuZWF0aCB0aGUg
ZW5lcmdldGljLCBzdGF0aW9uYXJ5IGZveC4=",
"tests": [
{
"tcId": "id-ML-DSA-44",
"pk": "EWoNgliCgU7GOoTqJ1BCV4WR/izOHNrm717rEbJ0FfMMH+38K7zEVhsZrm00b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",
"x5c": "MIIPjDCCBgKgAwIBAgIUfBL+fTjkvp10eezFK6d4FCUGw1gwCwYJYIZIAWUD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Fields
| status | PROPOSED STANDARD |
|---|---|
| stream | IETF |
| wg | lamps |
| date | November 2026 |
| obsoletes | |
| updates |